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2002) but does not mention that Audi has his own version of moderate 
foundationalism that is different from Plantinga’s. After the publication 
of TSF, Audi has developed his model in the context of theological 
epistemology in his Reason and Religious Commitment (ouP, 2011). 
Audi’s moderate foundationalism might be a  serious option for those 
who are not too keen on the proper functionalism of Plantinga.
In conclusion, I admit that although I am not sure whether I identify 
myself directly with the analytic theology movement, I  very much 
sympathize with the approach that it represents and find myself agreeing 
with most of what TSF says, especially with the critiques of various non-
foundationalist theologies and the accompanying robust theological 
realism. TSF splendidly identifies and analyzes the deep philosophical 
issues inherent in theological proposals. As for the attempt to ground 
theology in Plantinga-style proper functionalism, I  am not that sure. 
Despite my worries about rauser’s own solution and his limited discussion 
of current internalist proposals, I wholeheartedly recommend the book 
to theologians that are interested in the epistemology of theology as 
well as to philosophers that are thinking about theology and theological 
method. That being said, I would not direct theological and philosophical 
novices to the book, because of the density of its arguments and the need 
for extensive background knowledge for understanding it.
SCoTT DAVISoN
Morehead State University
Vincent brümmer, What Are We Doing When We Pray?: On Prayer 
and the Nature of Faith, Ashgate, 2008.
This is a  revised and expanded version of a book originally published 
by the author in 1984. Part I, which concerns prayer in the Christian 
tradition, takes up the first seven chapters of the book, and Part II, which 
concerns the nature of Christian faith, takes up the final three chapters. 
Here I  shall summarize briefly the contents of each chapter before 
making some general remarks about the audience to whom this book is 
most likely to be useful.
Chapter 1 outlines the questions to be discussed in the book, including 
some methodological ones about how to study the phenomenon of 
192 booK reVIeWS AND NoTICeS
prayer and how to think about its efficacy. Included in this discussion is 
a helpful explanation of the difference between a particular prayer, such 
as elijah’s prayer in 1 Kings 18, and a scientific experiment, such as the 
measurement of the deflection of starlight by the sun’s gravitational field 
that confirmed einstein’s theory of relativity. brümmer also discusses the 
difficulties involved in attempts to test the efficacy of petitionary prayer 
by appeal to statistical analysis, with reference to the particular example 
of Francis Galton (whose work was first published in 1872). He argues 
convincingly that since petitionary prayer involves personal interaction 
with a free agent, as opposed to some kind of natural force, it cannot be 
studied reliably using the usual methods of scientific testing.
Chapter 2 begins with a  discussion of the views of Kant and T. r. 
miles, both of whom argue (but for different reasons) that the proper 
function of prayer is to change the one praying, not to have any effect on 
God. brümmer admits that changing the person who prays is important, 
and cites a number of authoritative sources from the tradition to make 
his point, but also argues that Kant and miles are wrong to suggest that 
prayer functions completely independently of belief in the real existence 
of God.
Chapter 3 includes an extended discussion of the presuppositions 
implicit in the claim that petitionary prayer is impetratory, that is, 
successful in moving God to act. First, there is the presupposition of 
two-way contingency: the thing requested must be neither impossible 
nor necessary for God to provide. Second, the request involved in the 
offering of the petitionary prayer is necessary but not sufficient for 
God’s action. In addition, this chapter contains an extended treatment 
of the worry that since God is immutable, petitionary prayer is pointless. 
brümmer argues that St. Thomas Aquinas’ picture of the immutability of 
God, together with Thomas’ belief that God is timelessly eternal, implies 
that all events would be predetermined from eternity, so that petitionary 
prayer would be pointless. The argument here is brief and sketchy, though; 
Aquinas scholars will not find it compelling. After considering (but not 
endorsing) an alternative formulation of immutability from Peter Geach 
(involving a distinction between real and so-called ‘Cambridge’ change), 
brummer quotes John lucas with approval, who says (roughly) that God 
can change in some respects but not others. The conclusion is that if 
God is absolutely immutable, then petitionary prayer is pointless, but we 
should not think that God is absolutely immutable.
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Chapter 3 also includes a discussion of the worry that since God is 
omniscient, petitionary prayer is pointless. brümmer criticizes boethius’ 
defence of the claim that God is timelessly eternal, concluding that 
‘Petitionary prayer presupposes a God who can have a temporal relation 
with human persons and the world’ (p. 47). Again, the argument is 
rather quick; defenders of timeless eternity will not find it compelling. 
based on the contingency presupposition mentioned above, brümmer 
argues that the future does not exist yet, and hence cannot be known 
by anyone in advance, including God. So he accepts the open theist’s 
picture of the limits of divine omniscience. As many readers know, 
a  convoluted, highly technical debate between open theists, defenders 
of timeless eternity, and defenders of middle knowledge has exploded in 
the past twenty years or so. Those who follow that debate closely will not 
find brümmer’s discussion of this question very satisfying because the 
arguments, once again, are brief and sketchy.
In chapter 4, brümmer discusses impetratory prayer and the goodness 
of God. Stressing that petitionary prayer changes both God and the 
petitioner, he argues that praying for other people signals a willingness 
to help them where possible, and thus that corporate intercessory prayer 
involves multiple people participating in bringing about the kingdom 
of God. He also analyzes the prayer, ‘Thy kingdom come’, as involving 
a submission to God on behalf of the person praying and a request for 
God to assume authority over us and grant us ‘the gifts that enable us to 
attain the “union of wills” with him’ (p. 62). Here he also raises a difficult 
question about intercessory prayer, one that has received some attention 
in the literature: if intercessory prayer for others is regarded as effective, 
does this mean that God would have withheld assistance had prayers 
not been offered? Considering and rejecting solutions offered by others, 
brümmer stresses that God’s action in the world is (typically) mediate, 
involving secondary causes, but it is not clear how this addresses the 
problem at hand.
Chapter 5 concerns the nature of divine agency. brümmer argues 
persuasively that God’s answering of prayers need not involve 
miraculous intervention into the natural order, but then raises the 
following interesting question: if a given event has a natural explanation, 
then how can it be an answer to prayer as well? He responds by claiming 
that not only would a deterministic approach to nature preclude human 
freedom, it is also outdated – according to current science, there is 
always ‘room’ for things to be otherwise, even in connection with highly 
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probable events, because of quantum indeterminacy in nature. In this 
way, brümmer signals his allegiance to a libertarian account of human 
freedom. Drawing heavily on the work of J. r. lucas, he argues that a free 
human action can be viewed as something for which both its human 
author and God are responsible at the same time, calling this a ‘double 
agency’ theory. Does such an account make it impossible to tell whether 
or not God has answered one’s prayer, when the thing requested comes to 
be, since God’s role in the natural world is, as a rule, invisible? brümmer 
thinks not, arguing that ‘The ability to recognize God’s actions by 
looking at the world through the eyes of faith requires training, in which 
petitionary prayer has an important function’ (p. 87). There are deep 
and difficult issues at stake here, both metaphysical and epistemological, 
and no doubt some readers will find brümmer’s treatment of them to be 
rather brief and general.
Chapter 6 elaborates the distinction between unitive and personal 
mysticism, and defends the importance of prayers of petition, penitence, 
and thanksgiving for a personal relationship with God. Along the way, 
brümmer provides detailed and interesting accounts of the nature of 
prayers of penitence and the conditions in which gratitude (and the 
attribution of responsibility in general) is appropriate. At one point, 
brümmer commits himself to the conclusion that ‘I can only praise or 
blame you (or be grateful or resentful) for what I perceive you to have 
done, if I know what your intention was in doing what you did’ (p. 112). 
This requirement is probably too strong, though (which is probably 
good, because often we do not have epistemic access to the intentions 
of others, human or divine, and yet gratitude and resentment can still be 
appropriate in some of those cases).
Chapter 7 contains a detailed discussion of the relationship between 
morality, religion, general principles, and the use of models and 
metaphors. brümmer argues that the relation between prayer and the 
moral life is an internal one, not an external or accidental one, and that 
‘Prayer and the life of fellowship with God are impossible without each 
other’ (p. 131).
Chapter 8 begins Part II of the book, and argues that as a result of the 
enlightenment, we have come to view religious belief as a kind of theory 
that admits of confirmation or disconfirmation in roughly the same way 
that scientific theories do. brümmer argues to the contrary that faith is 
not a matter of propositional belief alone, and that it is ‘not only a way 
of seeing but also a way of living or a  form of life’ (p. 145). Chapter 9 
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continues this theme by developing in some detail the idea of the ‘eyes 
of faith’. He argues that ‘religious experience should not be viewed as an 
extraordinary kind of extra-sensory perception, but rather as ordinary 
experience (including ordinary sense perception) looked upon with 
the eyes of faith’ (p. 149). He applies this framework to the problem of 
confronting evil in the world, which requires seeing the world through 
the eyes of faith, and discusses the role of metaphor in such seeing.
Chapter 10 contains a discussion of truth, verification, and the life of 
faith and prayer. Here brümmer argues that the life of faith presupposes 
objectively true beliefs about the nature and existence of God, beliefs 
that are implicit in the forms of prayer discussed earlier in the book. He 
also argues that ‘belief in the existence of God is justified for believers 
by showing that it is a necessary presupposition constitutive for the way 
in which they make sense of their lives and experience’ (p. 177), not 
by appeal to the sorts of neutral perceptual evidence that enable us to 
determine which scientific theory is most justified. but he does not take 
this to imply that there is no neutral territory on which believers and 
non-believers can meet – instead, he says that
The debate between religious believers and secular atheists should 
therefore deal primarily with the coherence, intelligibility, relevance 
and adequacy of the theistic form of life and understanding as such and 
only in a  secondary or derived sense with the truth of its constitutive 
presupposition about the existence of God. In this debate secular atheists 
should also be called upon to account for their alternative view of life. 
(pp. 181-2)
As before, here brümmer engages deep and important epistemological 
questions without hesitation, and sketches an important position worthy 
of consideration.
The main virtue of brümmer’s book is the wide range of topics that 
it covers in order to present a coherent, complete picture of the role of 
prayer in the life of Christian faith. It is important to state clearly that 
his project is thoroughly Christian from the beginning; often he refers 
to scriptural passages or influential thinkers from the tradition as 
evidence for or against various positions. So brümmer’s book would 
be very useful for those who teach at Christian universities where there 
is a  reasonable expectation that the students would have more than 
a passing acquaintance with the tradition and perhaps some interest in 
pursuing a life of Christian faith.
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For those who are interested in contemporary philosophy of 
religion, especially in the analytic tradition, brümmer’s book provides 
a  helpful introduction to many questions concerning the nature of 
prayer, and shows how all of these questions are related to one another. 
but as indicated, those who are interested in technical debates among 
professional philosophers will find the book disappointing because the 
arguments are often brief and sketchy. Some of the sources cited are also 
a  bit outdated, in the sense that positions outlined therein have been 
superseded by much more detailed and complete accounts generated by 
the many philosophers working in the philosophy of religion since the 
first edition of brümmer’s book was published in 1984.
In conclusion, What Are We Doing When We Pray? is a substantial 
and important contribution to contemporary philosophy of religion, 
a  contribution that will be especially interesting to those who wish to 
explore and elucidate a distinctively Christian conception of the life of 
prayer.
JoSHuA C. THuroW
University of Texas – San Antonio
Jesse Bering, The God Instinct: The Psychology of Souls, Destiny, and 
the Meaning of Life, Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2011.
In the last 20 years cognitive science has gone where others have recently 
feared to tread: developing and testing explanations of religious beliefs and 
behaviours. Not only has their work flourished, but it has also captured 
the imagination of a segment of the reading public. Several surveys of 
the field for the general reading public have already been published – 
from Pascal boyer’s Religion Explained (2001) to Justin barrett’s Why 
Would Anyone Believe in God? (2004), Todd Tremlin’s Minds and Gods 
(2006), and Daniel Dennett’s Breaking the Spell (2006) (not to mention 
more scholarly works such as Scott Atran’s In Gods We Trust (2002) and 
Jeffrey Schloss and michael murray’s (ed.’s) The Believing Primate (2009), 
as well as robert Hinde’s Why Gods Persist (1999/2010) and David Sloan 
Wilson’s Darwin’s Cathedral (2002)). Jesse bering, a  leading researcher 
in the cognitive science of religion and one of the principle investigators 
on the explaining religion Project, has penned his own entry in this 
